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I. INTRODUCTION
American products liability buffs, who often have a
predilection for history, may remember 1994 as a year of proclaimed
harmonization, codification, and restatement. In April 1994 the
American Law Institute released the first Council Draft of its
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. According to the
Institute, "[p]roducts liability is highest in priority for reformulation"
within the law of torts generally, "for it is socially important and
technically complicated."' During the same year, the Republican
party announced a Contract With America that promised national
reform of products liability; after the November election, the new
congressional majority attended promptly to the federalization of
products liability law.2
Nineteen ninety-four also marked a less-heralded event in the
annals of comprehensive treatments of products liability, the publica-
tion of Product Liability by Jane Stapleton of Balliol College at
Oxford.3 Stapleton's book is in part commentary on another grand
restatement, the European products liability reform statute.4 It also
serves as a basic text of common-law doctrine. At a richer level, how-
ever, Product Liability is a great work of destruction, an attack not
only on the basic dogma that there ought to be a separate law for
harms caused by manufactured products but also, more obliquely, on
the very idea of restatement.
1. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
xiii (Tentative Draft No. 1, April 12, 1994). This work product goes by many names, and, like
many other commentators, I use 'Third Restatement," "products liability restatement," and
"Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability" loosely and interchangeably.
2. See Peter Passell, Civil Justice System is Overhaul Target, N.Y. Times B7 (Jan. 27,
1995). The Republican statute, the Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act, created
federal standards and rules to impose national consistency, as well as new restrictions on
lawsuits, in all of products liability law. See Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act, H.R.
917, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 13, 1995). For an analysis of the statute, see Carl Tobias,
Common Sense and Other Legal Reforms, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 699 (1995).
3. Jane Stapleton, Product Liability (Butterworths, 1994) ("Product Liability).
4. For the full text of the European products liability reform statute, see Approximation
of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning
Liability for Defective Products, Council Directive 85/374, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29.
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Interpreting Product Liability as critique, this Book Review
contrasts Stapleton's centrifugal treatment of products liability with
the better-known, better-financed, and voguish view that what this
subject needs is reconciliation or synthesis-that is, restatement.
Although Stapleton takes pains to state doctrine in detail, it is
obvious that she disapproves of much of what she describes.
Ultimately her book condemns the project of describing and improving
all products liability in a single formulation. This argument is a
timely response to the various products liability restatements of 1994,
especially the ALI endeavor.5
Applying the word "restatement" to the European statute and
American federalization of products liability law is not customary and
may demand a working definition. A restatement, as I use the term
here, is a codification, produced by a group of persons and subject to a
vote, that purports to reconcile and improve the state of legal doctrine
in a particular subject, where at least part of this doctrine derives
from the common law. Since political power is implicit in this defini-
tion, a restatement must be the product of a legislature, influential
institute, or quasi-governmental organization.
Created in response to the disarray that comes from multiple
federal-style jurisdictions, semi-autonomous legal decisionmakers,
conflicting scholarly commentary, and pluralist competitions for
power, a restatement seeks improvement of the law through simulta-
neous ordering and change. Put another way, as was stated in the
founding documents of the ALI, the goals of restatement are three:
"clarification, simplification, and 'adaptation [of the law] to the needs
of life.' ", The combination of reconciliation and reform underlies
restatement and its near-synonyms: unification, codification, and (in
European jargon) harmonization.
Having had occasion elsewhere to note the tensions of restate-
ment or harmonization in the context of products liability reform,7 I
5. I use the common-noun "restatement" generically and the proper-noun "Restatement"
to refer to the work product of the ALL. Compare by analogy, Arthur L. Corbin, The
Restatement of the Common Law by the American Law Institute, 15 Iowa L. Rev. 19, 26 (1929)
(calling the early work of the ALI "merely the latest" of many restatements).
6. N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the
American Law Institute, 8 Law & Hist. Rev. 55, 81 (1990) (citations omitted). A similar decla-
ration appears in the House report accompanying the Common Sense Product Liability Reform
Act, H.R. Rep. No. 104-63, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-12 (1995), and the preamble to the European
directive, 1985 O.J. (L 210) at 29-30 (cited in note 4).
7. See Anita Bernstein, A Model of Products Liability Reform, 27 Valp. U. L. Rev. (1993);
Anita Bernstein, L'Harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products Liability Attempted in the European
Community, 31 Va. J. Intl. L. 673 (1991). I was influenced by Stapleton's outstanding critique of
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continue to doubt that products liability restaters can simultaneously
accomplish each of their stated objectives. Stapleton, an early critic of
products liability reform efforts, now goes further, and Product
Liability points to weaknesses inherent in all attempts at common-
law harmonization. I discuss some of these weaknesses, as well as
strengths, in Part II.
The value of restatement depends on antecedent conditions
that vary from subject to subject. To be useful, a restatement must
begin with a clearly-asserted problem (something more than "lack of
uniformity"), articulate and observe normative boundaries, and ad-
dress an audience that is receptive to its authority and guidance.
Where these conditions are absent, the restatement will achieve nei-
ther clarification nor simplification nor adaptation of the law to the
needs of life. All restatements, even those that do not fulfill these
conditions, add some value. Variable prospects suggest, however,
that given scarcity of resources, the areas of law to be restated should
be selected carefully. In Part III, I argue, pace Stapleton, that prod-
ucts liability is a subject ill-suited to restatement.8
Yet efforts to improve products liability remain worthwhile,
and Part IV commends Product Liability as an exemplar of products
liability reform. Stapleton has offered suggestions for doctrinal re-
form built around a normative center. This structure takes a bit of
effort to find because Stapleton (who is perhaps deliberately not a
builder of edifices) scatters her arguments, repeats herself, and veers
from her chapter headings. These occasional flaws do not hide the
plain integrity of her work. Rather they suggest the unruly force of
products liability itself, a force that cannot rest in peace, despite
restatement.
II. THE VALUE OF COMMON-LAW RESTATEMENT: A RETROSPECTIVE
It is the purpose in making the Restatement to state the existing principles of
the common law as they have been developed by the courts up to this time.
Where a difference of opinion upon specific questions has arisen, the Institute
necessarily is compelled to make a choice between the two positions. In
the European statute. See Jane Stapleton, Product Liability Reform-Real or Illusory?, 6
Oxford J. Legal Stud. 392 (1986).
8. Professor Shapo considered the same question a year ago in this Law Review, and
reached conclusions that overlap partially with mine. See Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the
Law of Products Liability: The ALI Restatement Project, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 631, 691-97 (1995).
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making [a] choice it endeavors to state, so far as possible, the consensus of the
best legal thought .... 9
This ALI mission statement, acknowledging the tension be-
tween reconciliation and reform, implies that the former is prior to
the latter. Reform, no matter how good in theory, needs to be sup-
ported by multiple authorities, or "consensus." This Part examines
the drawbacks and benefits of an emphasis on reconciliation.
A. The Restatement at Century's End
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld dreamed of academic 'Juristic cen-
ters" at law schools;1 in 1921, Benjamin Cardozo anticipated an
American "ministry of justice."" Two years later, these ideals gained
form as the ALl. Unelected by the public yet influenced by quasi-
legislative commitments, the ALI set out to combine the best elements
of elitism and democracy.12
Since 1923, historians and commentators have continually
published their disagreements about the nature of the ALI's famous
work product. Their inquiries are fundamental. Was the
Restatement designed to be a codification, or instead an amulet worn
around the common law to repel codifiers?13  Were its writ-
ers-notably members of two new professions, full-time legal
academics and corporate lawyers-reactionaries, or instead what
Natalie Hull has called reformist "progressive-pragmatics"?' 4 Is the
Restatement an end in itself, or a transition to full national codifica-
tion . la the civil-law democracies, 5 to a federal common
9. What is the American Law Institute? 2 (unpublished 1935) (on file with the Author).
For a more recent elaboration on this theme by a prominent ALI member, see Shirley S.
Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin and the American Law Institute,
1995 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 18-21.
10. See Abrahamson, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. at 8 (cited in note 9).
11. Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113 (1921).
12. See This is the American Law Institute (ALI, n.d.) (on file with the ALI) (describing
the internal election of members and the practice of voting by membership).
13. See Nathan M. Crystal, Codification and the Rise of the Restatement Movement, 54
Wash. L. Rev. 239, 242-45 (1979) (summarizing the debate over whether the ALI restatements
are codifications); Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 58-59 (Ohio State, 4th ed. 1977)
(arguing that the restatements fended off "statutes all around-a universal, Benthamite
codification'). Compare by analogy Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 676
(Simon & Schuster, 2d ed. 1985) ('The proponents [of restatement] were hostile to the very
thought of codification').
14. See Hull, 8 Law & Hist. Rev. at 83-85 (cited in note 6); Friedman, A History of
American Law at 676 (cited in note 13).
15. See Mitchell Franklin, The Historic Function of the American Law Institute:
Restatement as Transitional to Codification, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1367, 1372 (1934).
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law, 16 or to more ambitious law reform?17 Rather than answer these
large questions, the ALI has favored an approach of inclusion. This
approach assumes that a restatement is both conservative and
progressive, something like a code and something like a treatise, an
arena for academics and lawyers alike, and an institution whose past
and future contain paths headed in many possible directions.
I raise here a smaller version of the great questions pertaining
to the specific goal of reconciliation. What is the reason for attempt-
ing to make order out of common-law disorder? Participants in early
ALI efforts have left behind their answers to this question. These
purposes, still current, help to site the restatement in a bygone age.
Defending the new ALI initiative, the great contracts scholar
Arthur Corbin contended in a 1929 article that, although case law fits
together quite well with a "high degree of uniformity" of precedents,
some variation does exist.'8 This variation can be either "ignorant and
unintentional" or "the result of a conscious choice by the judges."' 9
Happily, a restatement comports with both sources of variation. As
an authoritative declaration of the law, it may be depended on to
reduce errors of ignorance. As an ongoing synthesis-Corbin believed
that restaters should work slowly and continuously-a restatement
stays ever alert to minority-view innovation and may in time divert
"the stream of decisions. '20
Professor Corbin's dichotomy appears sensible enough. When
judges stray from what Herbert Wechsler called the "preponderating
balance of authority,"21 this departure may be either intended or unin-
tended. Given these two reasons for nonconformity, a restatement
can help. But the Corbin reasoning, although probably compelling in
its time, falters today.22 There are now better measures than a re-
16. See Corbin, 15 Iowa L. Rev. at 25-26 (cited in note 5).
17. See Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 186-89 (Brentano's, 1930) (stating that
codification "cannot create a body of rules which will exclude judicial innovation and thereby
guarantee complete predictability). See also William P. LaPiana, "A Task of No Common
Magnitude" The Founding of the American Law Institute, 11 Nova L. Rev. 1085, 1105, 1107
(1987) (identifying Roscoe Pound's diagnosis of socio-legal ills as fundamental in the establish-
ment of the ALI). Compare by analogy Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The American Law Institute:
What it Is and What it Does 10 (Roma, 1994) (characterizing the ALI as a "Vehicle for
Conservative Reform'.
18. See Corbin, 15 Iowa L. Rev. at 27 (cited in note 5).
19. Id.
20. Id. See also Herbert Wechsler, Restatements and Legal Change: Problems of Policy in
the Restatement Work of the American Law Institute, 13 St. Louis U. L. J. 185, 190 (1968)
(discussing the choice between "opposing lines of authority").
21. Wechsler, 13 St. Louis U. L. J. at 190 (cited in note 20).
22. One problem with the dichotomy is that it presumes a nice separation between the
"facts" and the "law" of a case, the former destined to be applied to the latter. At least one
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statement to reduce the incidence of error; and the second category of
intentional variation, presupposes a consensus or mainstream that is
more problematic now than in 1929.
1. The First Problem of Variation
When the possibility of writing common-law restatements was
discussed in the first two decades of the century, lawyers were only
beginning to recover from the embarrassment to formalism occasioned
by the simple publication of judicial opinions. The nineteenth-century
belief that judges "find" or "discover" the law by engaging their facility
for legal science could not withstand the revelation of inconsistent and
erroneous judicial statements. No realist critic ever devastated
Christopher Columbus Langdell more than the early output of the
West Law Book Publishing Company.23 Inaccuracies were rampant.
An American Bar Association statistic of 1885 reported that half the
cases that reached appellate courts were reversed.24 According to ALI
founders (who, it must be admitted, had a stake in what they were
saying), in the early decades of this century lawyers wrote briefs, and
judges rendered decisions of law, of appallingly low quality.25
Accuracy at the turn of the century demanded slow human
effort. Unknown at the time the ALI was founded were not only the
electronic databases, spellcheckers, citators, videotape, and spread-
sheets taken for granted at century's end, but also electric typewrit-
ers, microfilm records, audiotape, photocopiers, and ballpoint pens.
Add to the primitive technology of recordkeeping such open questions
of the day as how many states (with their court systems) would enter
the Union; whether women and African-Americans could be admitted
important realist disagreed: "Perhaps nine-tenths of legal uncertainty is caused by uncertainty
as to what courts will find, on conflicting evidence, to be the facts of cases." Zell v. American
Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641, 648 (2d Cir. 1943) (Frank, J., writing for the court), rev'd, 322 U.S.
709 (1944). For an analysis of the law/fact distinction that explores similar themes, see Jeffrey
C. Alexander, The Law/Fact Distinction and Unsettled State Law in the Federal Courts, 64 Tex.
L. Rev. 157, 176-79 (1985). In this post-realist light, a judge could well contribute to uncertainty
by her treatment of what she perceives to be the facts of a case, even if she possesses maximally
accurate information about the law and intends never to depart from it.
23. See Hull, 8 Law & Hist. Rev. at 57 (cited in note 6). Langdell had a defense of sorts.
He maintained that some judicial opinions were "useful and necessary," others "useless and
worse." But he never explained exactly how to tell good from bad. See Daniel J. Klau, Note,
What Price Certainty? Corbin, Williston, and the Restatement of Contracts, 70 B.U. L. Rev. 511,
515-16 (1990) (quoting C.C. Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts v-vi (1871)).
24. Report of the Special Committee Appointed to Consider and Report Whether the Present
Delay and Uncertainty in Judicial Administration Can Be Lessened, and If So, By What Means,
8 A.B.A. Annual Rep. 329-31 (1885).
25. See Hull, 8 Law & Hist. Rev. at 81 (cited in note 6).
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to the bar; whether night law schools such as Minnesota and Iowa
could be accredited; and what to do about the "horde of alien races"
that threatened to enter the profession,26 and one might sympathize
with those who hoped that a restatement could, in the words of the
products liability co-reporters, "settle troubled waters.' '27 The problem
of variation that Corbin identified was urgent in this time of upheaval
and technological nalvet6.
Today legal information technology, especially electronic data
storage and retrieval, offers the single most powerful cure for Corbin's
problem of unintended variation in case law, primarily because it
eliminates many of the stages of human input in the communication
of a judicial opinion to readers.28 This technology is fast and accurate.
The United States Supreme Court, for instance, can transmit opinions
to one electronic publisher minutes after handing them down, and the
opinions are loaded into databases within twenty minutes of receipt.29
Software converts judicial opinions and other data into word-process-
ing files.30 Although the printed page is still integral to good research,
each year more and more of what goes into a brief, a memorandum of
law, a draft of a judicial opinion, or a law review article can be found
without leaving one's computer.31
In addition to providing text relatively unvaried by the monk-
like copying and scribing of another era, electronic publishers work to
26. Id. at 62-63 (quoting Harvard professor Joseph Beale, President of the Association of
American Law Schools, in 1914: "within the last twenty years a horde of alien races from
Eastern Europe and from Asia has been pouring in on us, accustomed to absolute government,
accustomed to hate the law, and hostile above all to all wealth and power" (citation omitted)).
In 1874, one lawyer suggested that Columbia Law School require either a Latin examination or
a college diploma for admission: "This will keep out the little scrubs (German Jew boys mostly)
whom the School now promotes from grocery counters in Avenue B to be 'gentlemen of the
bar.'" Quoted in LaPiana, 11 Nova L. Rev. at 1124 n.155 (cited in note 17) (citation omitted).
27. James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, Will a New Restatement Settle
Troubled Waters: Reflections, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1257, 1257 (1993).
28. In the short run, the proliferation of information technology can produce additional
variation and uncertainty. For instance, a freer market in case pagination, in derogation of the
copyrighted and proprietary West page numbers, would be somewhat chaotic. Conflict also
exists between print and electronic means of recording cases, insofar as the former lends itself
to page breaks, while the latter encourages another type of break, perhaps at the paragraph
level. For a good overview of some of these problems, see Anthony Aarons, Cite-Fight: The War
on West, Law Office Computing 47 (April/May 1995). It seems reasonable to assume, however,
that these transitional difficulties will be relatively easy to fix.
29. How a Slip Opinion Becomes a Reported Case, 15 Password: The Newsletter for the
Power Westlaw User 7 (March 1995).
30. See Laura Peritore, Congress Watching on LEXIS, WESTLAW, LEGI-SLATE and
Congressional Quarterly's CQ Washington Alert, Database 104, 105, 107 (Oct. 1993).
31. See Richard A. Matasar and Rosemary Shiels, Electronic Law Students: Repercussions
on Legal Education, 29 Valp. U. L. Rev. 909, 926 (1995).
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eliminate variation through editorial cleanup. 32 Electronic publishers
also give away time online, in exchange for early access to new
opinions, to court personnel who create case law.33  This exchange
may contribute to uniformity. As developments in artificial
intelligence progress, electronic media will continue to make the
substance of case law more regularized. 34 The automation of common-
law authority could never have been imagined by law reformers who
worked to reduce variation in the early years of this century. Their
cure for uncertainty, though sensible in 1923, must now be defended
or continued for reasons other than reducing ignorant variation.
2. The Second Problem of Variation
Consider next Corbin's second category, variation with scien-
ter, or deliberate departures from the consensus. Corbin dealt crisply
with insider-reformers: 'Those who believe that certain sections of
the Restatement are ancient and out-of-date rules should at once get
busy and prove it publicly. Such work forms the basis of the new and
constant revisions that are to come."35 Though perhaps progressive in
1929, this stance no longer looks forward. Instead, it recalls an
earlier day.
The twentieth century-its realism, postmodernism, critical
theory, legal sociology, and group politics--did great damage to the
ALI's plan for integrated, e pluribus unum, certain, and unvarying
restatements of the common law.36 Legal realism maimed the notion
that "cases can be arranged to make sense-indeed scientific sense. ''37
Social movements, in challenging such American givens as racial
32. West estimates that it corrects over 80,000 errors a year in the opinions it received
from judge-authors, and "guarantees [a high] level of accuracy in case law." 15 Password at 7-8
(cited in note 29). As a law clerk in the mid-1980s, I helped to write judicial opinions that were
later published in West's Federal Supplement, and recall a couple of tactful phone calls during
the year from West editors suggesting that our office might not have intended to write what we
had written-they were correct.
33. Id.
34. For example, "relevance ranking," whereby a search program ranks retrieved docu-
ments in descending order of probable relevance may be a harbinger of intelligence to come. See
Peritore, Database at 104 (cited in note 30).
35. See Corbin, 15 Iowa L. Rev. at 28 (cited in note 5).
36. Scholars debate whether the ALI ought to be identified with the Jacksonian era or
instead with Progressivism. Compare LaPiana, 11 Nova L. Rev. at 1126 (cited in note 17)
(stating that the ALI, "a twentieth century bottle holding distinctly nineteenth century wine,"
expressed "an idea of law unchanged" from the antebellum era), with Hull, 8 Law & Hist. Rev.
at 84-85 (cited in note 6) (calling the founders of the ALI "progressive-pragmatist[s]" hostile to
Langdell's formalism (citation omitted)).
37. Gilmore, The Death of Contract at 59 (cited in note 13).
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inequality and empire-minded warfare, attacked Corbin's premise
that non-majority viewpoints bear the burden to "get busy and prove"
their claim to respect. Synthesis, an endeavor hailed in the
Restatement, is no longer extolled.38 Its decline is expressed variously
in rejection of the metaphor of the melting pot, the scorn of integra-
tion and assimilation by proud minority-group leaders, and in the
ascent of diversity as a value.39 The academic debate over whether
the Restatement stood in its time for reaction or reform scarcely
affects the conclusion that at century's end its premises have become
quaint.
Twentieth-century legal and jurisprudential history has also
eroded the prestige of common-law doctrine, although probably not to
the extent that some conservative commentators fear.40 This loss of
prestige has negative consequences for restatement. Stapleton uses
the rather ungainly word "substantivism"'41 to describe what she sees
as a departure from the more formal doctrinal reasoning that used to
prevail in the United States and still carries weight in the United
Kingdom. 42  In their post-Holmesian attention to social justice or
other ends, she writes, American judges now regard legal rules as "a
mere guide to decision making."43  Accordingly, cases become
particularized, of reduced interest except as to their facts, or perhaps
specimens of individual thinking.
Similarly, critics have complained that judicial opinions are
barely judicial at all, but rather the product of law reviewers who
remain devoted to their footnotes, parentheticals, monochromatic
prose style, and evenhanded contempt for both losing and winning
litigants.44 Rule-oriented legal writing has withered under the influ-
38. Professor Friedman, for instance, writes that the early draftsmen of the ALI
"expended their enormous talents on an enterprise which, today, seems singularly fruitless, at
least to those legal scholars who adhere to later streams of legal thought. Incredibly, the work
of restating (and rerestating) is still going on." Friedman, A History of American Law at 676
(cited in note 13).
39. See Benjamin Schwarz, The Diversity Myth: America's Leading Export, Atlantic
Monthly 57 (May 1995).
40. See Friedman, A History of American Law at 692 (cited in note 13).
41. Product Liability at 70 (cited in note 3).
42. Id. As Professor Partlett has suggested, American substantivism can be attributed in
part to the absence of public law reform institutions in the United States; institutions of this
kind function powerfully in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. The American
judiciary fills this void by engaging in law reform. See David F. Partlett, The Common Law as
Cricket, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 1401, 1422 (1990).
43. Product Liability at 71 (cited in note 3).
44. See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 107-08 (Harvard,
1985). Compare by analogy John S. Elson, The Case Against Legal Scholarship or, If the
Professor Must Publish, Must the Profession Perish?, 39 J. Legal Educ. 343 (1989).
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ence of university departments--economics, philosophy, and English
in particular-regarding what is considered original and important in
the law.45 The overt politicization of judicial selection has bred cyni-
cism regarding the bounds of precedent.46 If substantivism is at war
with doctrine and has been winning that war in the United States, as
Stapleton contends, then restatements become both harder to write
and of less benefit. At century's end there may be too little, but also
too much, to restate.
The same twentieth-century events that eroded consensus and
doctrine affect another premise of the restatement enterprise: that
the sectors competent to create legal rules, identified by the ALI as
bench, bar, and academy, should come together to improve the law
and benefit from the others' perspectives.47 Constituencies with an
interest in American law have changed since 1923 in several ways.
First, there are more of them. Second, their memberships are more
diverse-that is, fragmented-and accordingly less likely to gather in
the genteel fraternity recalled by the ALI's nostalgic memoirists. 48
Third, they have been divided on the subject of money; the prospect of
making a fortune in law has ceased to be the unmentionable, perhaps
unthinkable, topic that it was among the 1923 elite. In a newer cli-
mate of candor, federal judges quit the bench for the sake of money;49
the American Lawyer boldly prints data about firms' profits, reve-
nues, and reversals;50 and white-shoe lawyers fire their partners,
jump ship, speak in management-school technobabble, and try to ex-
pand their "business."'5 Undoubtedly this freer market has liberated
many lawyers and benefited many clients, but to judge by recent pub-
lications, it has caused some members of the bench, bar, and academy
to despise one another more than ever, making them suspicious that
45. Compare Donald B. Ayer, Stewardship, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2150, 2157 (1993) (decrying
the trend) with George L. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School
as University, 33 J. Legal Educ. 437, 437-41 (1983) (approving the trend).
46. See Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess 116-18, 147-50 (Basic Books, 1994).
47. For an expression of this view, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Undemocratic Legislation,
87 Yale L. J. 1284, 1286 (1978).
48. See Herbert F. Goodrich and Paul A. Wolkin, The Story of the American Law Institute:
1923-1961 at 5-7 (ALI, 1961); William Draper Lewis, History of the American Law Institute and
the First Restatement of the Law: "How We Did It," in Restatement in the Courts: Permanent
Edition 1 (ALI, 1945); Corbin, 15 Iowa L. Rev. at 20 (cited in note 5).
49. See David Ranii, When Ex-Judges Return to Practice: Welcomed by Firms, Natl. L. J.
1 (April 8, 1995); Surviving Justice, N.Y. Times A18 (Jan. 10, 1983) (describing the resignation
of Judge Mulligan from the Second Circuit).
50. See Steven Brill and Karen Dillon, A Marketplace in Turmoil, Am. Law. 5 (April 1995).
51. See G. Howland Blackiston, A Road Map for Quality in Legal Services, 43 Emory L. J.
507 (1994); Francy Blackwood, Going Global With Law, 28 S.F. Bus. Mag. 30 (April 1993).
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other lawyers, or other sectors of the profession, have gained at their
expense.52  The common purpose of the law has become harder to
state.
These rumblings have been amplified since 1987, after the
defeat of Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork. Bench, bar, and the
academy joined an affray that divided politically engaged lawyers
throughout the United States and exposed a new harshness in high-
level political appointments.53 This attitude toward government serv-
ice marks a transition from an earlier era. While the ALI continues to
exalt the American legal elite-individuals who aspire to the best
posts in government, the private practice of law, and the academy-a
pall continues to cloud these lawyers when they seek the recognition
of high level public service appointments. This post-Bork pall im-
pugns their ambition, belittles their accomplishments as merely
"political," puts them through litmus tests and petty-sounding inquir-
ies about their households, and, above all, implies that they are not
outstanding individuals.M One need not necessarily mourn the fate of
all who were Borked to note some consequences of political events to
the project of restatement. The Reagan Justice Department and its
heirs (or its liberal antagonists, if you would have it so) did damage to
the reputation of lawyers by suggesting that, even at their best, they
amount to little more than political booty. As the esteem of the
52. See generally Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the
Legal Profession Is Transforming American Society (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1994); Richard
A. Posner, Overcoming Law (Harvard, 1995). For a federal judge's view of practice-academy
hostility, see Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34 (1992).
Bench-bar-academy rancor emerges now and then in the writings of those who describe
their past service on uniform-laws task forces. In an early outburst, one professor labeled
Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, written by academics and practitioners, as "a delib-
erate sell-out" and "an unfair piece of class legislation... favoring the bankers over their cus-
tomers." Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be
Adopted, 61 Yale L. J. 334, 335, 362 (1952). See also Donald J. Rapson, Who is Looking Out For
The Public Interest? Thoughts About the UCC Revision Process in the Light (and Shadows) of
Professor Rubin's Observations, 28 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 249, 262 n.37 (1994) (giving a practitio-
ner's viewpoint: "All too often those who teach one of the topics under revision sit silently,
instead of participating and possibly improving the focus on public interest concerns. Only after
enactment do they end their silence-frequently in an article that is critical").
53. The harshness was not in fact new. Although the pillorying of judicial nominees based
on their writings and ideology is associated with Judge Bork's nomination, liberals complained
during the Reagan administration about the practice of targeting candidates nominated by
Democratic senators. See Herman Schwartz, Reagan Packs the Federal Judiciary, The Nation
513 (May 4, 1985). See also Carter, The Confirmation Mess at 3-5 (cited in note 46) (describing
the confirmation ordeal of Thurgood Marshall).
54. See Carter, The Confirmation Mess at 1 (cited in note 46) ('Borking for Fun and
Profit").
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American legal elite diminishes, it becomes less obvious to the public
that they are credible and trustworthy enough to restate the law.
B. Some Benefits of Restatement
Despite the political and social changes that have diminished
the value of restatement, the endeavor still offers benefits. Perhaps
most importantly, when viewed as a species of treatise, any restate-
ment makes contributions to human knowledge. 55 Contributors tend
to be talented and energetic and often produce work of a high quality.
The prestige of a restatement effort often impels participants to do-
nate their time or, in the case of ALI reporters, to work for much less
money than their efforts would otherwise command.56 Certainly some
participants could produce good treatises on their own, but the lure of
a restatement both attracts additional talent and encourages partici-
pants to spend their spare time improving the law, rather than pursu-
ing some less altruistic alternative project.57 By hypothesis, then, the
restatement as quasi-treatise delivers more benefit to the law than
would be possible in a world with treatises but without restatements.
In another treatise-like function, a restatement of a newly-
crystallized area of the law can expand human knowledge by fixing
that area of laWv as a separate subject.58 This function was proclaimed
in the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, which published in its
inaugural issue a sketch of the proposed Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers by its chief reporter. 59 In this piece, Charles
Wolfram wrote that "one may wonder why the Institute waited over
sixty years before beginning an examination of this most obvious
subject of inquiry."60 To Professor Wolfram, the "law of lawyering" as
a subject was already fixed by 1987 but, as he noted, some observers
55. Marshall Shapo has written that a failed restatement is "no more than a treatise writ-
ten by a committee." Shapo, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 654 (cited in note 8) (citation omitted). But it
surely is no less.
56. See John W. Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute to its Increasingly
Advantageous Quality, and an Encouragement to Continue the Trend, 13 Pepp. L. Rev. 59, 83-84
(1985).
57. See id. at 84 ("The meetings ... are eagerly anticipated by all participants and are
exhilarating while they last. There is the good feeling of being engaged in pro-bono work for the
benefit of the legal system as a whole, and of the country, to').
58. A not entirely facetious essay illustrates this function. Gretchen Craft Rubin and
Jamie G. Heller, Restatement of Love, 104 Yale L. J. 707 (1994).
59. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Concept of a Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers,
1 Geo. J. Leg. Ethics 195 (1987).
60. Id. at 196.
1995] 1675
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
expressed surprise at the initiative.61 In the years following, the le-
gitimacy of this subject-its fitness for restatement-grew clearer,
such that even a critic of the project observed that the restatement-in-
progress helpfully pointed up important matters of doctrine.62
Restatements that move into new territory also demonstrate the
contingency of legal concepts and help to temper the excesses, and the
stasis, of legal formalism.
Some restatements use their authority wisely and effectively.
In his defense of the Second Restatement of Torts, John Wade argued
that this compilation had achieved success on several points of doc-
trine precisely because of the unique authority of the Restatement.
For example, he wrote, the misleading "attractive nuisance doctrine"
needed to be banished, but common-law repetition and retrospection
tended instead to perpetuate it.63 Enter section 339 to the rescue.
"Courts quickly recognized the validity of the change in language,"64
and the law was improved more effectively than would have been the
case if, say, a federal statute had been attempted. Wade also praised
the Second Restatement for its intelligent treatment of
constitutionalized defamation law65 and for its general ability to find a
persuasive shade of gray between black and white alternatives.66
Comparative lawyers, who take an interest in restatements
because of their similarity to European civil codes,67 have pointed out
that a restatement facilitates the borrowing of law by other nations.68
Though skeptical about restatements, Arthur Rosett has described
them as useful "monuments to indicate the substantive harmoniza-
tion that has already occurred."69 Another comparativist, James
Gordley, has written that codification and restatement provide
61. Id.
62. See Ted Schneyer, The ALI's Restatement and the ABA's Model Rules: Rivals or
Complements?, 46 Okla. L. Rev. 25,44 (1993).
63. Wade, 13 Pepp. L. Rev. at 74 (cited in note 56).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 77-81.
66. Id. at 75-77.
67. See James Gordley, European Codes and American Restatements: Some Difficulties,
81 Colum. L. Rev. 140 (1981) (arguing that clarity and precision are not desirable goals for
either American restatements or European civil codes).
68. See Arthur Rosett, Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification, and Reform
in International Commercial Law, 40 Am. J. Comp. L. 683, 683 (1992). See, for example,
Hazard, The American Law Institute (cited in note 17) (a monograph by the director of the ALI,
published in Italy, informing lawyers outside the U.S. about the work and authority of the
Institute). The great precedent here may be the French Civil Code, a restatement of various
civil-law traditions that in turn led to borrowing and rewriting elsewhere, notably in the
German Civil Code.
69. Rosett, 40 Am. J. Comp. L. at 683-84 (cited in note 68).
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"authoritative starting points" for fledgling legal systems as well as a
useful reduction of starting points in more established settings.70
In a related function, restatements can streamline entire areas
of the law. They make research easier.71 Their division of content
into black letter and comments saves time for the harried lawyer who
must read quickly. Their neglect of a topic may well be salutary.
Restatement, in short, yields practical, doctrinal, and epistemological
benefits.
III. CAN PRODUCTS LIABILITY BE RESTATED? A THREE-QUESTION
FRAMEWORK
The look at restatement thus far in this Book Review has
produced a mixed judgment as to its value. Fitting precedent
together and improving the law, I have suggested, function at cross
purposes. 72 Moreover, the restatement project rests on assumptions
about consensus and deviation that after technological expansion,
post-realist insights, and political change, are no longer current. Yet
restatements have also improved and clarified the law. Given this
mixed history, one may hypothesize that for some subjects the
detriments of restatement will outweigh the benefits, while for other
subjects the converse will be true.
This Part ventures a method of identifying which problems, or
legal categories, are best suited to restatement. Three questions must
be asked. First, what is the problem that the restatement seeks to
cure? Second, to whom is the solution addressed? Third, do specific
normative principles guide and constrain the solution? If the answers
to these questions indicate a good prospect of synthesis and improve-
ment, then restating is worthwhile and perhaps even necessary.
More often, however, consideration of these variables will indicate
trouble ahead. Extrapolating from Stapleton's work, I conclude that
70. Gordley, 81 Colum. L. Rev. at 156 (cited in note 67).
71. One of the earliest antagonists of restatement, Charles Clark, admitted rather grudg-
ingly that they would probably reduce the bulk of case law that judges and scholars had to read.
See Charles Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 Yale L. J. 643, 654 (1933). This
benefit becomes even more important as case law proliferates.
72. A contrary theme surfaces in Marshall Shapo's essay on the Third Restatement.
Professor Shapo sketches an alternative vision of the restatement process, emphasizing defer-
ence to the judiciary, civility and mutual respect within the restating organization, and aware-
ness of political pitfalls. See Shapo, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 682-87 (cited in note 8). This idealized
ALI could indeed fit case holdings together and improve the law, although the organization
would move very slowly.
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products liability, somewhat amenable to restatement in the past,
now resists reconciliation and centralized improvement.
A. What is the Problem?
Restatements purport to cure problems of "variation" or
"uncertainty." As was explained in Part II, however, case-by-case
variation does not necessarily diminish in the presence of a restate-
ment,73 may be cured more effectively through technology74 and in
contemporary judgment may not even be a problem.7 5 In order to
improve the law, then, a restatement must do more than paper over
variation or condemn it. Restatements need goals that are derived
from clearly-perceived problems.
Perhaps the most obvious example of a useful restatement is a
successful revision of a predecessor. Here both the need for some kind
of restatement and the problems with the incumbent are conceded.
This situation does not exist in products liability, where scholars
disagree as to both the inadequacy of section 402A of the Second
Restatement of Torts76 and the need to have any products liability
restatement at all .7 Once again, a contrasting example may be found
in the area of attorney regulation.78 The ABA's Kutak Commission,
charged with the task of writing what would become the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, addressed a generally-accepted problem-the
flaws of the predecessor Model Code of Professional
Responsibility-and worked within a consensus that some rulebook
for lawyers was necessary.7 9 One could argue that the Code had not
achieved certainty in its time, but more important to the validity of
the Rules as restatement was its focus on specific problems80
73. See note 22.
74. See notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
75. See notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
76. See Oscar S. Gray, The Draft ALI Product Liability Proposals: Progress or
Anachronism?, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1105 (1994); Larry S. Stewart, The ALl and Products Liability:
"Restatement" or "Reform"?, 30 Trial 28 (Sept. 1994).
77. See William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991
U. Ill. L. Rev. 639.
78. See notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
79. Professor Schneyer argues persuasively that the Model Rules constituted a
"restatement-in-fact" in that they concern themselves with existing nondisciplinary doctrine and
codify decisional law. Schneyer, 46 Okla. L. Rev. at 37-43 (cited in note 62).
80. Problems included the Code's narrow focus on litigation, its awkward division between
serious rules aiid not-so-serious aspirations, and a structure that made amendments and
updating difficult. See Deborah L. Rhode and David Luban, Legal Ethics 115-16 (Foundation
Press, 2d ed. 1995).
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Closer to our subject, another example of a restatement that
was useful as response to a problem is section 402A itself, even
though it has provoked controversy throughout its lifetime. Taking
an outsider's fresh look at section 402A, Stapleton perceives its
creation as a rather guileless solution to a problem: not of uncer-
tainty, but of doctrinal weakness. As Stapleton tells it, William
Prosser and his colleagues wrote the final draft of section 402A in
1964 simply to extend the law of sales warranties to non-privy
purchasers., In support of her claim, she notes that manufacturing
interests did not "seriously" fight section 402A when it was first
promulgated;82 and she deems Prosser's admission that case outcomes
would be unchanged by his new rule as far more honest than his
bombastic talk about "the citadel. 83 Section 402A was intended to be
modest,84 and functioned modestly for many years. Only when fault-
related problems such as the meaning of non-manufacturing defects
and the standard of proof for design cases began to overwhelm the
warranty purpose of section 402A did this modesty and simplicity
fail.85
In its origins, however, section 402A addressed an identified
problem other than lack of certainty and thus fulfilled the first crite-
rion of a good restatement. Privity rules, which incidentally were not
uniformly applied in 1964,86 posed an injustice to those who purchased
goods that proved not to be of merchantable quality. Section 402A
81. Product Liability at 23-29 (cited in note 3). Specifically, Stapleton contends that the
scope of § 402A indicates that the rule was intended as "an amendment of sales rules" rather
than "a recognition of independent tort obligations." Id. at 26.
82. On this point, Stapleton overrelies on a few limited sources and thus neglects the
moderately serious attack on § 402A which occurred upon publication of the Second
Restatement in 1965. The Defense Research Institute objected to the adoption of strict liability,
a minority rule at the time. Wechsler, 13 St. Louis U. L. J. at 188-89 (cited in note 20). In a
formal "brief," this organization charged the ALI with departure from "its traditional role" and
resorting to "mere prophecy." Id. (citations omitted). Though timid in comparison to the tort
reform movement that would come in the next decade, this battle marked a crisis for the ALI
and drew attention to the conflict between reconciliation and reform. Id. at 189-92.
83. Product Liability at 26 (cited in note 3) (citations omitted).
84. Id. (stating that § 402A was a "fast, interesting, but basically modest, adjustment to
the liability rules governing the sale of goods").
85. See id. at 90-91 (arguing that the "focus on manufacturing errors allowed 402A and,
more importantly, its Comments to be drafted in a way which did not carefully confine its scope
to such cases. As the explosive potential of § 402A was later being realized in a flood of difficult
design defect cases, defenders of the rule-now revealed as a much more extensive rule than its
originators had foreseen-turned to more elaborate conceptual ideas').
86. See, for example, id. at 23 (describing the 1962 and 1966 UCC versions that contained
varying rules about privity); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960) (allowing a warranty action by a non-privy plaintiff); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962) (allowing a claim by a non-privy plaintiff who had
also failed to give timely notice of breach).
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extended warranty protection just one more step along the chain of
distribution. Whether or not Stapleton is right to argue that the
extension goes no further, interpreting section 402A as probably in-
applicable to bystanders,87 a fair reading of section 402A, with its
caveats, comments, and contemporaneous scholarship, suggests that
the original products liability restatement made a change in the law
that was relatively small, and that focused on a particular aberra-
tion.8 8 Drawing on the existing decisional law of warranty, section
402A linked traditions with policy imperatives and did not stray from
the identified problem, although its lapses from good draftsmanship
did lead to later straying.
By contrast, the Third Restatement wavers on the question of
"What is the Problem?" and thus provokes speculation, not all of it
fair, about the unspoken agenda of its co-reporters.89 By way of a
spoken agenda, Professors Henderson and Twerski have stated their
mission in articles and published symposia, as well as in extensive
comments to their ALI drafts. In these statements, they say that
several doctrinal questions remain open or divided, find ambiguities
and flaws in section 402A, and allude continually to the confusion and
fear that bedevil products liability.90
While these points are valid, Henderson and Twerski simulta-
neously promise too much and too little. As they admit, they cannot
clean up much of the doctrinal mess.91 They do not explain why infe-
licitous passages in section 402A, such as the phrase "defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous" and the incoherent Comment k, should
not simply be removed. If the anguish that accompanies products
liability is the problem, Henderson and Twerski, clever partisans who
87. With customary scrupulousness, Stapleton admits that the evidence for her conclusion
is mixed. See Product Liability at 27 (cited in note 3).
88. See id. at 90 (concluding that the framers of § 402A considered the reform "a limited
tidying up of sales law, intellectually neat and attractive but of relatively little practical impor-
tance").
89. See, for example, Philip H. Corboy, The Not-So-Quiet Revolution: Rebuilding Barriers
to Jury Trial in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 61 Tenn. L. Rev.
1043, 1046-47, 1073-74 (1994) (arguing that Professors Henderson and Twerski mistrust the
civil jury and seek to restrain it); Stewart, Trial at 30 (cited in note 76) (objecting to the co-
reporters' restating tort reform statutes rather than case law); Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles' Heel,
61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1265, 1265-67 (1994) (arguing that an inconsistent focus coupled with political
ambition has weakened the Third Restatement).
90. See James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1512, 1527-28 (1992); Henderson
and Twerski, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. at 1261-66 (cited in note 27).
91. Henderson and Twerski, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1530 (cited in note 90).
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love a sharp argument and a good fight, are hardly the solution.92
(For me, the co-reporters' putting their work forward as emollient
evokes a favorite word of theirs, chutzpah.93 ) By choosing not to high-
light one essential flaw of doctrine, Henderson and Twerski forfeit a
chance to create a center for their project. Nor do they explain how a
new restatement would function in the courts to solve the concatena-
tion of smaller problems that they name. Absences of explicit purpose
also characterize section 402A. Yet in section 402A, both
reconciliation with a tradition, and reform of a discrete yet central
doctrine, are patent.
More fundamentally, the Third Restatement lacks a conception
of products liability as a discrete area of the law. Its peculiar title,
Restatement of the Law: Torts: Products Liability, reveals confusion
about whether products liability is (or should be) a bounded, separate
category of the law. When the co-reporters provide a definition of
"product," they do so diffidently, expressing doubt that such a defini-
tion is necessary, inasmuch as they have decreed that most products
liability cases are resolved with reference to negligence. 94 Similar
ambivalence appears in the one-sentence text of their section 10:
"Whether a product defect caused harm is determined by the prevail-
ing rules and principles governing causation in tort. 5 This provision,
if not redundant, implies that a products liability rule can be contrary
to a tort rule, but no such conflict ever materializes in the Third
Restatement. This absence of conflict is consistent with the co-re-
porters' previously expressed view that "Products Liability" may
92. Professors Henderson and Twerski like to call themselves centrists. See, for example,
James Henderson, Revising Section 402A- The Limits of Tort as Social Insurance, 10 Touro L.
Rev. 107, 112 (1993) ('I am politically in the middle of the road"); Aaron D. Twerski, A Moderate
and Restrained Federal Product Liability Bill: Targeting the Crisis Areas for Resolution, 18 U.
Mich. J. L. Ref. 575, 628 (1985). However, several colleagues classify their stance as pro-defen-
dant. See, for example, Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive
Limitations, 41 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1193, 1236 n.405 (1994) (attributing an "anti-liability orienta-
tion" and "solicitude for industry" to Professors Henderson and Twerski); Teresa Moran
Schwartz, Prescription Products and the Proposed Restatement (Third), 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1357,
1363 (1994) (calling part of the Third Restatement "decidedly favorable to defendants").
93. The co-reporters commend this bit of Yiddish/Hebrew to their readers in James A.
Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, Products Liability: Problems and Process 23 (Little,
Brown, 2d ed. 1992), and in Henderson and Twerski, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1513 (cited in note
90).
94. The definition of a "product" appears in § 4 of the most recent Tentative Draft.
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 137-38 (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995)
("Given that design and warnings cases turn on essentially risk-utility evaluations, see § 2,
Comment c, the practical importance of whether something is, or is not, a product has dimin-
ished somewhat. Nevertheless, that issue remains important in the modern era to the extent
that the concept of strict liability retains functional meaning").
95. Id. at 260.
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properly be called Advanced Torts.9 6 Yet although Henderson and
Twerski have left little of "strict liability" standing, they have also
insisted on the separate identity of products liability as distinguished
from negligence. One Stapleton criticism of the European Union
statute--"[u]nless we have an adequate rationale for how, where and
why we have drawn boundaries around such a limited civil liability,
we may be unable to hold those boundaries stable"7-resonates here.
Simultaneously reifying and denying products liability, the Third
Restatement not only cannot answer the question of "What is the
Problem?," but it underscores the importance of that question.
Henderson and Twerski allude frequently to lack of uniformity,
the last refuge of a restater. At a forum on the Third Restatement,
Twerski concluded his remarks by decrying uncertainty:
When you are dealing with terms that make sense only to the Oracle at
Delphi, there is room for huge amounts of maneuvering. Lawyers are jealous
of that maneuvering space and sometimes correctly so. We have not written
and will not write a manifesto for "law reform." Although we have our own
personal view about what the law of products liability should be, we have not
imposed [it] on the Restatement. But we will impose some clarity, and there
are costs to clarity. Thirty years into the product revolution, we think that the
time has come to do that.98
Elaborating at the same symposium, Henderson described the
problem of uncertainty as a burden on insurance classification and a
source of social cost.99 Henderson, speaking more candidly than his
co-reporter, acknowledged that the Third Restatement would prob-
ably not "meet the reception of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 402A, which was an idea whose time had come."100 One reason
the time of the Third Restatement has not come is that its purpose is
not yet clear.
96. See Henderson and Twerski, Products Liability at xxix (cited in note 93).
97. Product Liability at 7 (cited in note 3).
98. Aaron Twerski, From a Reporter's Perspective: A Proposed Agenda, 10 Touro L. Rev. 5,
19 (1993).
99. Henderson, 10 Touro L. Rev. at 117-20 (cited in note 92). Professor Henderson
elaborates that if the scope of products liability faced by a particular industry is "per se,
unpredictable," then the manufacturers in that industry will have an incredibly difficult time
finding adequate insurance at a reasonable cost. "The actuaries would compute a sum of money
that represented the basic risks presented based on the statistics they had. Whatever figure
they came up with, they would multiply it by ten and maybe write some insurance. This would
be very, very costly to the insured." Id. at 117.
100. Id. at 108.
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B. To Whom is the Solution Addressed?
A restatement expresses commitment to the principle of seg-
mentation. It does not purport to achieve synthesis of all common law
or case law, but rather refines understandings about one doctrinal
category. As political documents written and ratified by groups, re-
statements must offer service to a constituency, whereas treatises or
other learned compilations do not address a segmented audience.
Thus, just as "uncertainty" and "lack of uniformity" are poor answers
to 'What is the Problem?," the question 'To Whom is the Solution
Addressed?" should preferably not draw the answer "everybody." By
the definition used here, a restatement must affect a significant num-
ber of people in order to earn this label. Past that point, though, the
more diverse the groups that a restatement tries to affect, the less
likely it is to work.
The best illustration of the point is the Ur-restatement, the
Uniform Commercial Code. The UCC derived its authority not only
from the stature of its father, Karl Llewellyn, but also from the idea
that merchants need a rulebook for the game they voluntarily play.
Llewellyn's code has provoked both hagiography and harsh criticism.
Admiring accounts describe a brilliant restater alert to the
commercial world around him, a scholar capable of both listening to
businessmen's anecdotes and building a great structure.1 1 Others
have argued that the notion of an apolitical commercial law code that
delivered rules based on what people need and do in business (with
neither empirical evidence nor a clear economic theory of the market)
is nonsense. 12 A more moderate assessment may be derived from
attention to the question 'To Whom is the Solution Addressed?" The
UCC is most useful where lawyers and their clients benefit from a
rulebook-article 9, on secured transactions, has been roundly
praised-but is less attractive to those who feel like outsiders. Literal
foreigners occupy the latter category, and comparative lawyers have
objected to the UCC because it separates domestic law from special
101. See Soia Mentschikoff, The Uniform Commercial Code: An Experiment in Democracy
in Drafting, 36 A.B.A. J. 419, 419-20 (1950); William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist
Movement 316 (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973).
102. See, for example, Friedman, A History of American Law at 675 (cited in note 13);
Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 Stan. L.
Rev. 621 (1975). In a distracted moment, Karl Llewellyn alluded in a memo to "a very
considerable body of commercial law which is very largely non-political in character, and which
can be put into shape to be flexibly permanent." Quoted in Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group
Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons From the Uniform
Commercial Code, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 83, 84 (1993).
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rules about international transactions, causing "vexacious and essen-
tially insol[uble] problems.'' 1°3 Figurative foreigners-such as those
who speak for bank customers or consumers of delivered household
goods, who could not have their interests represented adequately at
the time of codification-also complain about the way they are treated
in the UCC.104
Lessons from the reception of the UCC pertain to the restate-
ment of any type of accident law. Where doctrine is associated with a
haves/have-nots dichotomy, as is the case in the United States with
both accident law and commercial law involving consumers, a re-
statement will tend to favor the organized interests that can influence
its writing. Accident law may not be inherently more "political" than
other areas of law, but it functions in an overtly political way in the
United States.
Implications follow for the Third Restatement. One may gen-
eralize that, unless a political shift occurs, the entire Third
Restatement is likely to be weakened by plaintiff/defendant rifts,
more so than its two predecessors, which functioned in a less overtly
political liability system. 0 5 Within a torts restatement, certain
sections will fare better than others. By hypothesis, a restatement
will be most useful in describing those wrongs where individual
consciousness, rather than political or economic position, is under-
stood to divide agents from recipients of agency. Several intentional
torts fit within this amenable-to-restatement category.106 For negli-
gence and many types of strict liability, including products liability,
where an individual/firm (or haves/have nots) matrix serves as a di-
vider, a torts restatement will be of less utility.
103. Rosett, 40 Am. J. Comp. L. at 687 (cited in note 68).
104. Professor Patchel describes problems of collective action and pre-drafting compromise
to appease industry. See Patchel, 78 Minn. L. Rev. at 100-01 (cited in note 102). See also
Beutel, 61 Yale L. J. at 335 (cited in note 52); Grant Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A
Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 Yale L. J. 364 (1952).
105. On political rifts as tending to weaken the Third Restatement, see Shapo, 48 Vand. L.
Rev. at 686 (cited in note 8) (recounting a colleague's remark that, after attempting to restate
products liability, "next, the ALI will undertake a Restatement of Abortion).
106. Here I mean to classify intentional torts with other torts that do not fit squarely
within an intentionallnegligence/strict-liability triad, such as dignitary torts and nuisance. For
this category, harm may be said not to be "accidental," and neither plaintiffs nor defendants
occupy an obvious political or economic category. The Second Restatement made its best
contribution in these areas. Its sections on the invasion of privacy are especially good.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652A -6521 (1977). I lack data to support the point, but my
impression is that Torts instructors-who read the Second Restatement looking for pedagogical
merit-strongly prefer the sections on assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress to those on negligence and related questions of legal cause. Although § 402A may be
the most famous section of the Second Restatement, it is famous for reasons other than its
utility and clarity.
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Over the last twenty years, working within this division of
enterprise versus individuals, defense-based interests have fueled the
tort reform engine. It is hard to overstate the division between the
two classes. High-stakes crisis talk, dichotomizing plaintiffs and
defendants, has accompanied products liability for decades. This
energy seems to sustain itself as books, articles, statutes, conferences,
speeches, and reforms all seem to produce more of the same, so much
so that 1994, the year of urgent central planning in products liability,
may not even mark the peak. In almost all of the tort reform debate,
polarization is presumed.
Many writers have sought to position themselves in the center
between these two poles, and the ALI and its co-reporters see this rift
as an opportunity to mediate and "settle troubled waters." Yet the
ALI has had little moderating influence. In the state houses, public
opinion, and even Congress, defense interests have done so well that
they would not wish to support any restatement except one too lop-
sided for a bench-bar-academy coalition to deliver. Consumer organi-
zations and the plaintiffs' bar mistrust the ALI for its earlier
Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury, its sources of funding,
and its enthusiasm for the political center at a time when the center
has been pulled to the right.10 7 Plaintiffs' advocates appear more
comfortable competing directly against their adversaries with judicial
campaign contributions and state-level lobbying. The two camps
agree on few matters, but probably would agree that the Third
Restatement is not addressed to them.
C. Do Normative Principles Guide and Constrain the Solution?
Divisions between plaintiffs and defendants contribute to the
third vulnerability of a products restatement: an absence of agree-
ment about underlying principles. This problem, though related to
political dichotomies, is independent of them as Richard Posner has
demonstrated. Skeptical generally of attempts to codify the common
law, Posner described in an early article the chaos that results when a
107. On hostility to the Enterprise Responsibility report, see Elizabeth C. Price, Toward a
Unified Theory of Products Liability: Reviving the Causative Concept of Legal Fault, 61 Tenn. L.
Rev. 1277, 1316-17 & n.281 (1994). See also Stephen D. Sugarman, A Restatement of Torts, 44
Stan. L. Rev. 1163, 1163 (1992) (describing political conflicts present in, and generated by, the
ALI report); Bruce S. Kaufman, Attorneys Spar Over Restatement (Third) of Torts: ATLA to
Mobilize Opposition to ALI Project, 22 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 436,437 (1994).
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restatement does not stay within coherent normative boundaries. 08
His examination of defense-of-property tort law considered a belief
manifested in the First and Second Restatements: human life and
limb are more important than property, except when they are less
important.1 9 Because the ALI could not declare a consistent norma-
tive principle informing spring-gun law, Posner wrote, it should have
stayed out of the business of restating it.1 0 His suggested normative
commitment-efficiency analysis, with all cant about "transcendant
value" removed-though repugnant to many, would have taken a step
toward coherence.
Stapleton makes a similar argument in the middle part of
Product Liability, called simply 'Theory.""' Products liability, she
writes, has "a plethora of rationales, some of which are internally
inconsistent," and "a ragbag of reasons" but "no indication of the
weight and priority to be given to each."1 2 Although Stapleton di-
rectly addresses the European Union products liability law, her com-
plaint about theoretical "shallowness" m also applies to section 402A
and American products liability law.
Her major criticisms are numerous. First, as was mentioned,
she questions the validity of a rule limited to products. 14 Stapleton
goes on to attack what she calls "liability as an economic strategy,"
and although "market apologists" and the "crude use of the Coase
Theorem to provide a rationale for laissez-faire ideology ' 111 absorb the
brunt of her criticism, she is also dissatisfied with the liberal
Calabresian version of an, economics rationale. According to
Stapleton, the concept of the cheapest cost avoider cannot work in any
but the most simplified settings and is fraught with complications.11 6
Noneconomic theories of liability, such as Richard Epstein's liber-
tarianism 7 and Ernest Weinrib's formalism, 1 8 receive more cursory
treatment. Stapleton says that they rest on assertion and, like some
108. Richard A. Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14 J. L. & Econ.
201 (1971).
109. Id. at 205-06.
110. Id. at 208. Jonathan Macey makes a similar point in his attack on the ALI's Corporate
Governance Project, an attempt at restatement that failed, he argues, because it lacked a
coherent normative or conceptual commitment. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Transformation of
the American Law Institute, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1212, 1215 (1993).
111. Product Liability at 89-230 (cited in note 3).
112. Id. at 91.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 96-97.
115. Id. at 118.
116. Id. at 103-05, 138-48.
117. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973).
118. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 Vap. U. L. Rev. 485 (1989).
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economic theories, on simplification as well.119 This section of Product
Liability may not find a constituency of readers because most of
Stapleton's arguments will be familiar to specialist scholars, yet they
are presented in too much disorder to be especially accessible for new-
comers to liability theory. 120
One might also carp a little at Stapleton's high standards. Not
only products liability but all of civil liability would buckle a bit under
her gaze were she to aim it more widely. Some of the criticisms she
levels at the European directive, and the theorists whose work under-
lies some of the statute, can be pointed at her own affirmative writing
in Product Liability. 2' Nevertheless, Stapleton has written a
powerful rebuttal to the prevalent enthusiasm for restatement of
products liability, establishing the incoherence, instability, and arbi-
trariness of the subject. She argues persuasively that an orderly law
of products liability cannot be achieved.
A short extension of Stapleton's argument indicates that at-
tempts to reconcile products liability might be worse than inaction.
To the extent that products liability law, or indeed accident law,
shows any commitment to a principle, that principle is ad hoc deter-
mination of responsibility, or anti-formalism. This generalization is
especially true of American law. Anti-formalism is most strikingly
expressed in the peculiar American toleration of jury trials in accident
cases. As the personal-injury lawyer Philip Corboy has argued, a con-
nection may exist between the (formalist) products liability restate-
ment and tort-reformist hostility to the civil jury in the United
States.122 A formalist law of accidents is certainly imaginable,
especially to Commonwealth scholars, as the works of Ernest Weinrib
demonstrate. 123 Stapleton (an Australian working in Britain) also
expresses some interest in formalism, although she avoids that word,
favoring "boundaries"124 or "clear rules" instead.125 Academic and
legislative efforts to increase the formalism of American tort law,
however, have achieved scant results. Hostility to plaintiffs,
personal-injury lawyers, and juries is not quite the same thing, even
119. Product Liability at 103-79 (cited in note 3).
120. Although Stapleton refers somewhat apologetically to the book's "unconventional"
structure, id. at v, she neglects to apologize for the state of the Index.
121. See notes 128-43 and accompanying text.
122. See Corboy, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. at 1073-74 (cited in note 89).
123. See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of
Law, 97 Yale L. J. 949 (1988); Ernest J. Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87 Colum. L.
Rev. 472 (1987).
124. Product Liability at 275 (cited in note 3).
125. Id. at 302.
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though the tort reform movement frequently veils its proposals in pro-
doctrine rhetoric.126 As long as the major normative principle of
American accident law remains that of anti-formalism, a restatement
of this subject is doubly infirm.127
IV. REFORM WITHOUT RESTATEMENT
By avoiding the mistakes that have harmed several ALI work
products-that is, inability to address one central problem, attempts
to reconcile elements that will not mix, and moral or political confu-
sion about goals-Stapleton leaves products liability doctrine in a
better condition than where she found it. Product Liability, in other
words, offers reform without restatement. Stapleton's reformist ef-
forts may be described with reference to two categories. First, she
works within the boundaries of a stated normative tenet. Second, she
writes helpfully about sources of doctrinal error. These efforts paral-
lel the ALI mission of improvement of the law on the one hand, and
clarification and simplification on the other. Stapleton's reformist
work, being that of an individual, does not have the legislative effect
of a restatement, but it does render Product Liability among the most
impressive reconceptions of products liability in the current
marketplace of ideas on the subject.
A. The Normative Tenet (or "Improvement" of the Law)
Stapleton believes that the law should redress some accidents
through negligence doctrine and others through strict liability, and
further argues that "the profit motive coherently identifies many
activities where liability ought to fall in the latter category."128 It is
the pursuit of financial profit rather than any characteristic identified
with mass-marketed products (such as advertising, design coupled
with manufacture, or readily apparent opportunities to internalize
126. See, for example, Victor E. Schwartz and Liberty Mahshigian, A Permanent Solution
for Products Liability Crises: Uniform Federal Tort Law Standards, 64 Denver U. L. Rev. 685,
693-94 (1988) (expressing confidence in the ability of products liability law to stay within fed-
eralized rules); Law Firm of Sidley and Austin, The Need for Legislative Reform of the Tort
System: A Report on the Liability Crisis from Affected Organizations, 10 Hamline L. Rev. 345,
352 (1987) (urging a return to "Fault As A Basis For Damages Under Tort Law').
127. This point is not an original one: the realist scholar Leon Green, who continually
argued for flexibility and change in accident law, disapproved of the First Restatement,
complaining about its "stiffness and pompousness." Leon Green, The Torts Restatement, 29 Ill.
L. Rev. 582, 588 (1935).
128. Product Liability at 185-86 (cited in note 3).
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costs or spread risks) that explains the rise of a stricter rule for prod-
uct-occasioned harms.129 Moreover, Stapleton continues, the profit
motive as a source of distinction between negligence and strict liabil-
ity fits with "ordinary people's ascription of responsibility,"' 13 the
development of section 402A, 13' nineteenth-century sales law,132 vi-
carious liability,' 3 and workers' compensation."m
It is hard for a reader to tell how seriously Stapleton takes the
pursuit of profit as a normative dividing line. She chooses to phrase
her endorsement of the idea in it-could-be-argued lawyerspeak,' 35 and
adds a disclaimer: "I am not necessarily promoting it in preference to
other rationales but using it to show that, by providing a basis for the
limitation of product rules to activities 'in the course of the defen-
dant's business' it provides a considerably better fit with those rules
than economic theories, although still not a completely satisfactory
fit. ' As if to forestall red-baiters, Stapleton adds an FDRish remark
about wanting to save capitalism from itself, suggesting that "long-
term confidence in a profit-based economy" may depend on something
like strict liability, whereby business pays its way.'37 Her caution
notwithstanding, Stapleton contributes to an emerging dialogue about
products liability as an event of significance in political history.138
But, as Stapleton intimates, "the profit motive" as a unifying
explanation of modern products liability or enterprise liability creates
problems that are both tactical and theoretical. If Stapleton really
does mean to propose that American and European doctrine jettison
"products liability" in favor of "profit motive liability" (she prefers
"strict moral enterprise liability,'1 39 but the distinction would likely be
lost) this candor could lead to costs of all kinds. Tactical prudence
would suggest that an explicit linkage between liability doctrine and
129. Id.
130. Id. at 186.
131. Id. at 189.
132. Id. at 188.
133. Id. at 190-93.
134. Id. at 193-95.
135. Id. at 186, 188.
136. Id. at 186.
137. Id. at 188.
138. Compare by analogy Anita Bernstein, A Products Liability Anthology 177-257
(Anderson, 1995) (compiling different perspectives on products liability).
139. Product Liability at 185 (cited in note 3).
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the profit motive may threaten the perceived authority and autonomy
of positive law. 140
At the level of theory, using the profit motive as an explana-
tory device raises additional questions of descriptive accuracy and
conceptual appeal. I agree with Stapleton that reference to profit
explains vicarious liability, especially respondeat superior, more
convincingly than most attempts at economic analysis. Prior to the
profit-motive chapter of Product Liability, however, Stapleton uses
defamation as the paradigmatic strict liability tort,141 even though the
profit motive pertains only very slightly to defamation. Furthermore,
Stapleton has not elaborated on her construct--does profit mean
something like "large profit?" How does the profit motive differ from
(anyone's) rational choice, or the Freudian desire to maximize pleas-
ure and minimize pain?-and so it is hard to measure this normative
tenet. Countervailing indicators in products liability, such as plain-
tiffs-conduct defenses and statutes of repose, suggest limitations of
profit-motive theorizing. Readers need a fuller description of "the
profit motive" in order to compare it with other efforts to explain
anomalies of liability law, such as Saul Levmore's concept of econom-
ics-tinged "immoderate group liability,"42 or my suggestion that
manufactured products play unique sociological and political roles.143
But even this fragmentary and controversial normative tenet
helps make Stapleton's products liability reform effort more valuable
than current efforts at restatement. Regardless of their political
stance, readers who know the purpose of Stapleton's descriptive
summary acquire a reference point by which to judge the efficacy of
her book. As debates over whether the Third Restatement is centrist
or pro-defendant reveal, quarrels about the purpose of descriptive
writing get in the way of analyzing that writing. The frank cards-on-
the-table courage of Stapleton's talk about profit also underscores the
appeal of a single, individual intelligence behind products liability
reform.144 Again a sharp contrast with the ALI project is evident:
140. Stapleton appreciates the symbolic import of liability law but has reservations about
symbolism as a justification for an expensive and imprecise legal institution. Her preliminary
ideas on the subject are thoughtfully presented. See id. at 347-48.
141. See id. at 177.
142. Saul Levmore, Gomorrah to Ybarra and More: Overextraction and the Puzzle of
Immoderate Group Liability, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1561 (1995).
143. Anita Bernstein, How Can a Product Be Liable?, 45 Duke L. J. 1 (1995).
144. The same appeal is present in products liability reform arguments that come from the
right side of the political spectrum. See Peter W. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and its
Consequences (Basic Books, 1988) (providing an account of the history of products liability law
as a means for developing future reforms); Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/ Utility, 48
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when Twerski says that a particular chQice was foreclosed to the
Third Restatement because only five states favor it, one wonders who
among the population able to count to five needs a Third
Restatement.15 A vision of products liability-cum-enterprise liability-
cum-welfare capitalism may offend a reader, but the normative tenet
demands attention. Genuine reform can follow from this kind of en-
gagement of one's audience.
B. Grappling With Doctrinal Anomalies (or "Clarification" and
"Simplification" of the Law)
In addition to proposing a normative tenet that guides reform,
Stapleton immerses herself in virtually every issue of Anglo-American
products liability law. Though conversant and comfortable with the
theories of Aristotle, Tony Honor6, and Ernest Weinrib, among many
others, Stapleton never flinches from doctrine. For instance, she
takes the trouble to make sharp points about the European directive's
agricultural provisions.46  Her efforts pay off. Product Liability
reveals itself as a learned work in both familiar and unexpected ways.
Stapleton's central insight about products liability rules is that
they tend to migrate. She begins with a close reading of the European
products liability law.'4 Despite differences between the directive
and American rules-for example, the European law attaches
responsibility to "producers" while in the United States it is
commercial suppliers who are strictly liable-the two are similar for
purposes of the point she makes.14 8 Stapleton divides the terms of
products liability law into rules of "relatively stable boundaries' " 9 and
Ohio St. L. J. 469, 474-77 (1987) (attacking open-ended balancing tests and endorsing bright line
"rules of thumb" in the alternative).
145. See Caveat Emptor: Will the AL.I. Erode Strict Liability in the Restatement (Third)
for Products Liability?, 10 Touro L. Rev. 21, 53-54 (1993) (remarks of Prof. Twerski). In fairness
to the co-reporters, these conclusions generally require more than the ability to count. For
instance, in this "forty-five to five" example, Twerski was referring to the vitality of Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982), a precedent that has probably
(but not certainly) been overruled in its home state and that might (or might not) be favored by
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Yet Twerski spoke bluntly about counting to fifty as a high duty
of any restater: "On any theory of a restatement of law, if you are working forty-five to five,
that is irresponsible." 10 Touro L. Rev. at 53-54. But see notes 81-85 (describing the origins
of § 402A, the "restatement" of a strict liability rule that had been accepted in only a handful of
states).
146. Product Liability at 303-05 (cited in note 3).
147. Id. at 49-52.
148. Id. at 3-4.
149. Id. at 275.
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rules that are "specific sources of instability."'150 She illustrates the
division with definitions and examples. Rules with relatively stable
boundaries, though vulnerable to change, evolve in a manner and at a
pace resembling that of all liability law. Examples of this first
category include principles of causation, rules about what constitutes
a claim, and caps on damages. 151 Rules that are specific sources of
instability are inherently distorting, incentive-shifting, hard to
explain, and contradictory in their application. Not surprisingly for
one who has read this far, rules of the second category occupy the
heart of products liability. Stapleton condemns, among other rules,
the limiting of products liability law to product-caused injury, rules
about who can be a products liability defendant, and the requirement
that the defendant have put the product into commercial
circulation.152
Central rules of products liability doctrine are unstable pri-
marily because they are not justified, nor even explained, by theory.53
Failings at the level of theory render the rules arbitrary. As a result,
ill-founded ideas about products liability within the population make
the fragile rules topple in practice. For example, Stapleton writes,
Americans injured by asbestos "blame the product" and often do not
think to sue building occupiers or architects, even though these actors
may have played important roles in causing harm. 54 Emphasis on a
product shifts attention from careless plaintiffs, derelict parents, and
irresponsible employers.
The belief that civil liability can increase safety, Stapleton
elaborates, rests on a prior belief that human behavior responds to
incentives; 55 but products liability rules obscure the goal of preven-
tion by diverting attention to things and away from persons.
150. Id. at 303.
151. See id. at 275-90.
152. See id. at 303-40. My own discussion of these vexacious rules agrees that they are
sources of instability, although I focus on their continued vitality; in other words, having
endured so long, these rules are probably better-founded than Stapleton assumes. See
Bernstein, 45 Duke L. J. at 1 (cited in note 143).
153. See Product Liability at 351 (cited in note 3) (using the exclusion of pure economic loss
claims as an example).
154. See id. at 343. Stapleton elaborates:
A specific products rule tends to imply that other causally relevant factors are to be
given less weight by the law, because the rule does not encompass claims against mere
users and other non-suppliers of products. Whereas in the law of negligence
consideration can be given to the role of intermediaries such as parents, occupiers or
users, their role is peripheral under a products rule aimed only at product suppliers.
Id.
155. See id. at 331 (indicating that all human behavior resulting in a dangerous condition
in a product should be the focus of liability).
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Moreover, in both Europe and the United States products liability law
coexists with-that is, does not preempt-older rules of negligence
and contract, leading to instability rooted in confusion about which
type of law should be used.156 New law (such as the European direc-
tive, American attempts at federalization, and indeed the Third
Restatement) compounds the problem, heaping more rules, more
classes of affected persons, and more need for decisions onto products
liability. In litigation, some of the fog can be cleared after each law-
suit is filed, especially if the rules of indemnity, impleader, and sub-
rogation work well. It would be better, Stapleton argues, to keep alert
for instability before litigants set it in motion.
In sum, Stapleton has claimed that the very category of prod-
ucts liability collides with the reform goal of clarification and
simplification of the law. A reader need not necessarily agree with
this conclusion-I have my own doubts-to appreciate the value of
Stapleton's insight about doctrinal instability. Stapleton is not alone
in her concern. The theme of instability surfaces in a contemporary
article by Jerry Phillips, who argues that the anomalous treatment of
manufacturing defects is an "Achilles' heel" in the Third Restatement,
threatening its superficial cohesion and order.15' Professor Phillips, a
prolific author of several books about products liability, as well as a
"provisional section 402A,"'15 presumably does not share Stapleton's
dislike of the category. Yet, as both scholars point out, and as
realists, practicing lawyers, and social scientists would agree, legal
doctrines do not repose calmly in a restatement or any other pristine
container, awaiting application by jurists.159 They press human be-
ings into behavior. When that behavior tends to undermine the struc-
ture of rules, inquiry into the theory behind these rules is demanded.
A lesson for those who would improve products liability law is
implicit in Product Liability: doctrine must be studied seriously so
that each rule's tendency toward stability or instability is revealed.
156. See id. at 356 (referring to "costly duplication").
157. See Phillips, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. at 1267-70 (cited in note 89).
158. See Jerry J. Phillips, Nicolas P. Terry and Frank J. Vandall, Products Liability:
Cases, Materials, Problems 14-15 (Michie, 1994) (proposing a provisional § 402A concerning
special liability for business supliers of defective products).
159. See Friedman, A History of American Law (cited in note 13); Oliver Wendell Holmes,
The Common Law 5 (Mark de Wolfe Howe, ed., 1963); Gilmore, The Death of Contract at 58
(cited in note 13); John Monahan and Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,
Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477, 477-78 (1986). For
practicing lawyers' comments on the impossibility of understanding products liability as a
collection of pristine rules, see Corboy, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. at 1043 (cited in note 89); Sara Deutch
Schotland, A Practitioner's Perspective on the Teaching of Product Liability Law, 45 J. Legal
Educ. 287 (1995).
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Of course, no rule ever remains perfectly stable or unstable. As
Calabresi and Melamed taught, the boundaries of all liability catego-
ries are permeable.160 The stability criterion, however, goes a long
way toward clarification and simplification of the law. Its most im-
portant function, Stapleton says, is to shed light on the principles
behind doctrine. She concludes that "U]udicial reasoning attracts
respect where affected parties perceive a clear, agreed and consistent
set of principles on which it operates. Where it does not-as
here-doctrinal instability and political grievance may well result in
the longer term."161
V. CONCLUSION
Two scholars have remarked that the words "tort" and "crisis"
are paired "so often in print that they have taken on the character of
automatic association, like 'bread and butter' or 'death and taxes.' "162
One might make the same observation about "products liability" and
"reform." The history of modern products liability is full of charismat-
ics and visionaries, men who saw possibility in this narrow-sounding
category of doctrine. Justice Roger Traynor proclaimed strict liability
almost ex nihilo in a personal-injury opinion.163 William Prosser ac-
complished a similar coup in the writing and adoption of section
402A.'6 And Friedrich Kessler and Fleming James, who added their
dreams of a better future to the development of liability law,165 are
probably among the pantheon of what Peter Huber has called
Founders.166 The tort reform movement is a bit grayer, but it too has
brought forth leaders who see products liability reform as tending to
make a better world.167
Product Liability and its contemporary, the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, offer products liability reform of a
160. See Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
161. Product Liability at 352 (cited in note 3).
162. Glen 0. Robinson and Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 Va. L.
Rev. 1481, 1481 (1992).
163. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436,440 (1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring).
164. See Product Liablity at Part III.A.1 (cited in note 3).
165. George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461, 465 (1985).
166. Huber, Liability at 6 (cited in note 144).
167. See note 144. See also Richard Neely, The Product Liability Mess: How Business Can
Be Rescued From the Politics of State Courts (The Free Press, 1988).
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more sober kind. Both Jane Stapleton and the American Law
Institute seem to view their work as, at least in part, the cleaning up
of a disarray made by earlier reformers who did not foresee all of the
consequences of their ideas. Their separate approaches to order were
contrasted in this Book Review. While the co-reporters of the Third
Restatement, Professors Henderson and Twerski, view reconciliation
as the fitting-together of products liability case law and statutes,
Stapleton attempts to reconcile products liability with the wider
subject of civil liability.
Both Stapleton and the co-reporters profess interest in im-
provement as well as reconciliation of products liability law; and both
indicate, somewhat covertly, that the best improvement may lie in the
elimination of this legal category. This suggestion is less explicit in
the Third Restatement. Constrained by their official duties to restate
something called Products Liability, the co-reporters cannot give full
voice to their belief that the subject is merely a subcategory of negli-
gence. And so their work product is at war with itself, evading the
three questions that should be asked in the preparation of any re-
statement: "What is the Problem?"; 'To Whom is the Solution
Addressed?"; and 'o Normative Principles Guide and Constrain the
Solution?" As a result, the Third Restatement can achieve neither
reconciliation nor reform.
Stapleton, however, accomplishes reform as well as reconcili-
ation. Her central theme-that boundaries in civil liability must be
consonant with a sound theory of that liability-allows her to envision
change. Although Product Liability challenges the existence of prod-
ucts liability, it also accepts the realities of contemporary law.
Visionaries and practitioners alike need the insights of this book.
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